Fundamental physics makes no clear use of causal notions; it uses laws that operate in relevant respects in both temporal directions and that relate whole systems across times. But by relating causation to evidence, we can explain how causation fits in to a physical picture of the world and explain its temporal asymmetry. This paper takes up a deliberative approach to causation, according to which causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we need when we decide on one thing in order to achieve another. Tamsin's taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry, for example, if and only if her deciding to take her umbrella for the sake of staying dry is adequate grounds for believing she'll stay dry. This correspondence explains why causation matters: knowledge of causal structure helps us make decisions that are evidence of outcomes we seek. The account also explains why we can control the future and not the past, and why causes come before their effects. When agents properly deliberate, their decisions can never count as evidence for any outcomes they may seek in the past. From this it follows that causal relations don't run backwards. This deliberative asymmetry is itself traced back to asymmetries of evidence and entropy, providing a new way of deriving causal asymmetry from temporally symmetric laws.
Introduction
Causation plays an essential role in our scientific and everyday understanding of the world.
We discover causal relations using experiments in labs, studies and everyday life-such as when a chemist tests whether adding excess acid causes the wrong product to precipitate, or when statistical data are used to determine if a new drug decreases cholesterol absorption, or when you experiment with having less coffee to see if it improves your sleep. We also construct theories that describe and explain causal relations. Biologists map the causal relations involved in photosynthesis, physicists explain why absorbing a photon causes an electron to jump to a higher energy level, and you might hypothesise about how too much water is affecting your plant's health. Talk of causation is ubiquitous.
So it might come as a surprise that when we look to our best candidates for fundamental scientific theories, those that aim to be universal in scope and explain the success of other theories, causal talk doesn't appear. Fundamental physical theories don't identify particular states as causes, and others as effects. Instead they use dynamical equations that relate global states of affairs-no mention of causes. Furthermore, when we look more closely at fundamental physical laws, they seem to have precisely the wrong features to deliver causal relations. Firstly, the laws are not local in the way causes are. It might seem that if a billiard ball A collides with stationary ball B, causing it to move off, the local state of A moving necessitates B's motion, given the fundamental laws. But, as Russell famously argued (1912−13) , fundamental laws only determine states of affairs at other times given information about the entire global state of affairs. B's motion also depends on the fact every other billiard ball in the system fails to collide with it. Laws don't deliver local necessitation.
Secondly, fundamental laws don't reflect the temporal asymmetry of causation. It might seem that fundamental laws only necessitate states towards the future: a state involving A's earlier motion necessitates B's in a way that a state involving B's later motion doesn't necessitate A's. But fundamental physical laws, in relevant respects, work equally well in both temporal directions.
1 Altogether, given our intuitive view of causation, it's unclear how causation fits into the picture of the world presented by fundamental physics. Even if we don't follow Russell in trying to eliminate causal talk altogether, we need to look somewhere other than the predictions and derivations of fundamental physics to understand causation.
I'll take this to be Russell's challenge.
A promising strategy to respond to Russell's challenge has been to tie causation to counterfactuals and control. According to the general form of counterfactual accounts, effects depend counterfactually on their causes, such that by manipulating a cause we can manipulate its effects. If causation has this kind of practical import, we can make sense of why we need causal relations, in addition to the laws of fundamental physics. Fundamental physical laws capture the most basic and universal exceptionless regularities-those that hold across whole patterns of events. Causal structure captures how manipulating one local state can be a means of manipulating another-relations that higher-level sciences are often more interested in. If causation is tied to manipulation, we can understand why causal relations are needed, even if they don't feature explicitly in fundamental physics. Moreover, given how we rely on causal reasoning in decision-making, making sense of the practical import of causation is an important independent desideratum on accounts of causation.
The account I'll go on to defend shares features in common with a broad class of counterfactual accounts that take causation to have a practical import. But it aims to do better in one crucial respect. It is not enough to simply claim that the relations picked out as causal are relevant to our practical lives, or merely stipulate that the relations are ones of control or counterfactual dependence. One has to actually show that the relations picked out as causal or counterfactual are those that matter to our practical lives. There are many relations we might have picked out as causal, and many ways we might have evaluated the relevant counterfactuals. Why are these the right ones? How do they matter to us? Can we
show by some independent means that we should pick out these relations as causal?
This criterion is typically not explicitly appealed to in giving accounts of causation (although it plays a role). More often defenders are interested in whether a given analysis delivers our intuitive verdicts on core cases, or whether the relation is used in scientific practice. But it is an important criterion nevertheless in showing that an account picks out the relation it needs to. Analogous criteria appear in other areas of philosophy, where accounts must explain how a given property or relation fits into our picture of the world, in a way that explains why it should matter to us as it does. Accounts from meta-ethics, for example, should make sense of why ethical properties matter to our motivations; accounts of colour should makes sense of how color properties are perceptible. It is not enough to simply claim they are. Sometime the criterion is appealed to in order to attack other accounts: it is a point against a metaethical account, for example, if an ideally rational agent could accept an ethical proposition, but fail to be moved by it. Here I'm appealing to the criterion as a positive standard. It is not only a problem when the relations picked out by an account as causal manifestly fail to matter to our practical lives. Defenders must actually show how the relations matter. Without this, an account does not adequately show how causation fits into our picture of the world.
However, it turns out that popular counterfactual accounts of causation don't explain how the relations they pick out as causal matter to us. First, consider reductive counterfactual accounts-those that attempt to reduce causal relations to non-causal relations via counterfactuals. David Lewis' account (1973 Lewis' account ( , 1979 exemplifies this approach. According to Lewis, a causal relation obtains between two events just in case there is a chain of counterfactual dependencies between them. One event A depends counterfactually on another independent event B, just in case were A to occur B would occur and were A not to occur B would not occur. Lewis introduces a comparative similarity ordering between possible worlds to evaluate these counterfactuals. Roughly, a counterfactual is true at a world if the closest world where the antecedent is true is also one where the consequent is true.
Lewis takes the similarity ordering between worlds to be a metaphysical primitive. But he introduces standards by which similarity is evaluated, such as 'avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law', and 'it is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact ' (1979, p. 472) . He needs these standards in order to complete his reductive account.
But there's a problem. As Bennett (1984) and others note, Lewis gives us no justification for these standards. Why care about perfect match far more than imperfect match? Why allow for violations of the laws, if we can't actually violate them? These criteria look arbitrary and leave it mysterious why causation, understood in these terms, should matter to our lives.
Lewis takes his criteria to deliver the 'standard' resolution of the vagueness of counterfactuals (1979, p. 457) . He is also explicit that these criteria have been reverseengineered to deliver our intuitive causal judgments (ibid., pp. 466−7). But he does not explain why the criteria are appropriate, or why our intuitive judgments are worth following.
If someone uses different criteria and claims he would float, were he to jump out a window, we need to say more than that he is evaluating counterfactuals in a non-standard way. 2 Even if Lewis' account gets the extension of the concept CAUSATION right, it doesn't explain the practical import of causation.
Other reductive accounts inherit this problem, including the statistical-mechanical accounts of David Albert (2000 Albert ( , 2015 and Barry Loewer (2007) . These counterfactual accounts use results from statistical mechanics to explain causal asymmetry-avoiding problems with Lewis' account raised by Elga (2001) . However, they still do not justify the terms of their reductions. Loewer evaluates decision counterfactuals by holding the present macroscopic state of the world fixed and introducing changes to the microstate within the brain to model decisions. This means that changes to the microstate of the brain cannot be correlated with changes in the surrounding environment. But why should we rule out such correlations?
Albert uses a different method for evaluating counterfactuals, one that doesn't involve holding the present macrostate fixed. But he introduces an unanalysed 'fiction of agency' and employs similar standards, such as keeping the initial macrostate of the universe fixed. These standards need to be justified if we're to understand why causation, understood in these terms, should matter to us-and so fully address Russell's challenge.
3
What about non-reductive accounts? Judea Pearl (2000) and James Woodward (2003) defend interventionist accounts that relate causal relations to one another using 'interventionist 2 This is a particular problem for Lewis, who uses counterfactuals to formulate rational decision theory (1981) . 3 The nearest Albert comes to justifying the reduction is to claim that counterfactuals are evaluated using our 'normal procedures of inference ' (2000, p. 129) . But then the account faces the same problems as the deliberative approach regarding why evidential correlations to the past can't be exploited (section 4). See Frisch (2010) what it takes for a causal relation to hold. But they don't show that human actions or decisions ever satisfy the conditions on interventions, except by stipulation (Pearl 2000, pp. 108−9). And so they don't show that interventionist counterfactuals are ones we can make use of. Nor do they explain why it should matter to us that our actions do satisfy these conditions-why interventionist counterfactuals are ones we should care about. Woodward sometimes claims that the rationale for his requirements is 'commonsensical' (2014, p. 706) .
But the requirements on interventions are controversial, and require detailed specification.
They are not intuitive. Price and Weslake (2009) raise similar concerns.
At some points, Woodward claims interventionist relations are useful because they are 'potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation ' (2003, p. 7) and 'control' (2014, p. 696) . But he doesn't give an independent specification of manipulation or control. He simply assumes these are to be explicated in interventionist terms. But if one is worried that these interventionist counterfactuals are not latching onto useful relations, it is no comfort to be told that the relations they latch onto are useful because they are interventionist counterfactuals. Their usefulness of these counterfactuals is precisely what's in question.
Appealing to manipulation and control characterised in interventionist terms is too small a circle to be explanatory. While Woodward does explain why certain features of causal relations should matter to us, like stability across changes in background conditions (2000, ch. 6, 2014, p. 704) , he doesn't justify why interventionist counterfactuals should matter to us in general.
4
Interventionist accounts, on their own, don't justify why we should pick out certain relations as causal.
One could begin with an interventionist or reductive counterfactual account and attempt to show that it picks out a useful relation. In this paper, I take a different approach. Rather than begin with an account of causation and try to explain why that relation will be useful to agents, I'll begin by taking the practical import of causation to be central, and characterize causation in terms of how it is useful. This is to take a broadly pragmatist approach to causation. According to the 'deliberative approach', causal relations correspond to the evidential relations agents use when they decide on one thing in order to achieve another.
Say Tamsin is deliberating about whether to take her umbrella in order to stay dry. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the deliberative approach in detail. Section 3 considers how the approach differs from other agent-based accounts and how it delivers objective causal relations. Section 4 uses features of deliberation and evidence to explain why causes come before their effects and why we control the future and not the past.
The Deliberative Approach

From Evidence to Causation
According to the deliberative approach, causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we use when we decide on one thing in order to achieve another. The following The evidential biconditional implies that for two states of affairs to be causally related, an agent's deciding on one must be good evidence for the other. Say Tamsin is properly deliberating over whether to take her umbrella. According to the biconditional, her taking her umbrella is a cause of her not getting wet just in case her deciding on taking her umbrella (for the sake of not getting wet) is good evidence of her not getting wet. If Tamsin wants to avoid getting wet, and decides on a state that is a cause of not getting wet, she'll have made a decision that is evidence of an outcome she seeks. So she'll have made a good decision. If causal relations correspond to evidential relations in this way, knowing causal structure helps us make decisions that are evidence of outcomes we seek. So no wonder we care about causal relations.
Here's another example. Say Suzy is properly deliberating about whether to throw her rock.
Her throwing her rock counts as a cause of the bottle's breaking if her deciding to throw (for the sake of the bottle's breaking) is good evidence of the bottle's breaking. Or consider scientists who investigate why certain stereoisomers (molecules that are right-or left-handed) are more prevalent in biological systems than their mirror equivalents by bombarding organic molecules with spin right-or left-handed electrons (Dreiling and Gay 2014) . They find that left-handed bromocamphor is more likely to react with right-handed electrons (than left-handed), measured by the flow of bromide ions produced. By deciding whether to bombard left-handed bromocamphor with right-or left-handed electrons, a scientist can alter the ion current. The deliberative account correctly picks out the handedness of the electrons as a cause of the current intensity. A scientist's decision to use right-handed electrons on left-handed bromocamphor is good evidence for a higher current, when she deliberates on which type of electrons to use. So the electron-handedness is a cause of current intensity.
With these examples in mind, I'll now consider how the biconditional is to be read. Firstly, the biconditional involves a counterfactual on the right hand side. It makes a claim about what would be the case, were an agent to be properly deliberating. This is an important feature for securing the objectivity of causation (section 3.2). I discuss how such counterfactuals are evaluated in section 3.3.
What about evidential relations? A state of affairs is 'good evidence' for another if knowledge of its obtaining would, in general, license agents to infer to the latter and hold its obtaining fixed. 6 While what we are licensed to infer in any given case is sensitive our beliefs, we also have general evidential norms that pick out when knowledge of a state is typically license to infer to another (absent defeaters). It is these general evidential relations that the deliberative account appeals to. For example, storm clouds looming may be good evidence of later rain, because knowledge of their presence would typically license an agent to believe there'll be rain (even if being told that these are merely thunder-clouds presaging a lightning storm would undercut this license). According to the biconditional, Tamsin's taking her umbrella is a cause of her staying dry if and only if her deciding to take her umbrella generally licenses belief that she'll stay dry.
Because the evidential biconditional appeals to general evidential relations, an agent's deciding is not simply evidence for that agent. If Tamsin's deciding is good evidence she'll take her umbrella, and you know of her deciding, you also have good evidence she will.
Whether an agent has evidence depends partly on what observations she has made. But what her evidence is for does not depend on her background beliefs. Even if Tamsin has mistaken beliefs about the weather, storm clouds are still evidence of rain, and, if she's seen the storm clouds, she has evidence of rain. Good evidence also licenses agents to infer to the past and the future-a crucial feature if the temporal asymmetry of causation is to be explained, rather than presupposed. In section 3.2, I consider what relations might play the role of 'good evidence'.
The biconditional requires an agent's deliberation to be 'proper'. If an agent's deliberation is not proper, no causal relation is implied. Deliberation must satisfy certain epistemic requirements in order to be proper. These requirements reflect the fact that deliberation serves an epistemic function: it allows us to settle what we will do so we can engage in further planning (Bratman 1984 
Correspondence without Reduction
The evidential biconditional claims a correspondence between evidential and causal relations. The deliberative account does not aim to reduce causal relations to evidential relations. But it does aim to derive causal structure from evidential structure. It ultimately aims to relate causation to fundamental laws using evidence as a half-way step (see figure 1 ).
Causal Relations Evidential Relations
Fundamental laws and contingent states For example, say Suzy's deciding to throw her rock is good evidence of the bottle breaking.
Presumably this is because in the circumstances in which Suzy throws the rock (in a given direction), the underlying dynamical laws and an initial probability distribution make it highly probable that the bottle breaks. (More details on this in section 3.2.) If evidence relates to fundamental laws in this way, the approach provides an even stronger answer to Russell's challenge. But the approach does not rely on evidence being more metaphysically fundamental than causation: it may simply be that we can more easily relate causal relations to fundamental laws and probabilities via evidential relations.
The deliberative approach does its explanatory work independently of settling the metaphysical nature of the causation. This is an aim it shares with interventionist accounts. and why causes come before their effects (section 4).
Altogether, the deliberative approach sits somewhere between perspectival accounts like Price's, interventionist accounts, and reductive accounts. In common with reductive accounts, the approach relates causation to fundamental laws. But unlike reductive accounts, it does not merely aim to give necessary and sufficient conditions on causation. It explains why causation matters. In common with interventionist account, the deliberative approach takes causation to be centrally about manipulation and control. But unlike interventionist accounts, it uses an evidential characterisation of deliberation that does not rely on causal notions, and appeals to the epistemic function of deliberation to explain why satisfying the relevant conditions matters to agents. In common with Price's account, the approach thinks about causation via its relevance for deliberation. But, unlike Price's, it gives a substantive condition on causal relations themselves and fits them into a physical picture of the world.
Beyond Subjectivism
The deliberative approach ties causation to deliberation. For this reason, it might seem to imply a form of subjectivism, and be limited to situations involving agents. In this section, I
explain how the deliberative approach delivers objective causal relations, and how it differs from other agent-based accounts.
Aren't Agents Causal?
Appealing to deliberation to give an account of causation might seem like the wrong approach to take. After all, deliberation and agency are causal phenomena. How can we get a substantive constraint on causation if causal notions are already involved? Similar worries have been raised against agent-based accounts that take A to cause B if and only if bringing about A is a means of bringing about B. It seems they will be circular and uninformative because 'bringing about' is a causal notion (Hausman 1997; Woodward 2003, pp. 123ff ).
Price defends an agent-based account that is particularly vulnerable to this concern. He claims that agents must take their acts to be caused by their deliberation alone as they deliberate. 'To introduce the agent is in effect to assume an independent causal history to the event A. Those probabilistic correlations that survive this assumption seem to have claim to be counted as genuine effects of A' (1991, p. 169)-see also Price (ibid. pp. 165−6, 1986 Price (ibid. pp. 165−6, , pp. 199−201, 1993 . 9 Even though a circular account can be illuminating, an account will be more informative if it does not appeal to causal notions. The deliberative approach characterises deliberation in evidential and non-causal terms. Neither we as theorists nor the deliberating agent need to make explicitly causal assumptions.
One might also worry that evidential relations are themselves causal. In the next section, I
outline an account of evidential relations that doesn't appeal to causation. But even if we do characterise evidence in causal terms, we still have a sufficiently independent grasp of the concept EVIDENCE for the biconditional to be explanatory and illuminating. Evidence plays a distinct normative role in empirical enquiry. Whatever evidential relations turn out to be, they have been picked out as evidential relations because they are good ways for us to reason from one state of affairs to another. Appealing to evidence provides a non-trivial explanation of why causal relations are useful. 9 Price later (2012, pp. 528−31) follows Ismael (2007) Say Suzy picks up her stone and decides on throwing for the sake of the bottle breaking. If the fundamental laws are deterministic, a full specification of the state of the world will fix whether the bottle breaks or not. But agents like Suzy won't typically have access to the full state of the world. These relations aren't the evidential relations we use in higher-level science and when we reason. A more plausible starting point is to think that agents have access to the macrostate of the subsystem of Suzy, the stone and the bottle, and assume the subsystem is embedded in a stable and familiar surrounding environment. Given such assumptions, can fundamental laws determine the chance of the bottle's breaking?
A promising approach is to make use of the explanatory resources within science to work out these chances. Fundamental physics aims to explain the success of higher-level sciences, including non-fundamental physics. Given that chances feature in higher-level science, scientific explanations should be able to explain higher-level chances in terms of fundamental laws and additional features. We have toy examples where this is possible. Say there is a box containing gas particles that are partially dispersed at time t 2 . Given the fundamental laws, the standard statistical-mechanical probability distribution, the macrostate of the box, and the fact that the box is not further interfered with, we can derive the result that (with high probability) the gas will be more dispersed at a later time, t 3 . 10 So the partially dispersed gas is evidence of future dispersion. The same procedure won't work going backwards in time-it will deliver the result that the gas was more dispersed in the past, at t 1 : not the result we observe. But if we also conditionalise on the system beginning in a low-entropy state at t 0 (a standard move in Boltzmannian statistical mechanics), it's highly probable that the gas was less dispersed at t 1 . So partially dispersed gas is evidence of earlier clustering.
Why think these kinds of explanations are available more generally? Firstly, we have arguments that for folk physics to get going, systems have to be sufficiently often in quasiisolation from one another (Elga 2007) . The scientists investigating the decay of bromocamphor have to be able to isolate the ion current from other things that could alter its flow, other than the incoming electrons. Secondly, for us to do experiments in fundamental physics, or for fundamental physics to explain the success of other sciences, fundamental laws have to explain and be derivable from regularities that appear at the macroscopic level-concerning instrument knobs, rocks, CO 2 emissions, and so forth.
Thirdly, we often assume systems are in normal or default conditions-a fact appealed to in a range of accounts of causation, particularly counterfactual accounts (Hart and Honoré 1985; Menzies 2007; Hitchcock 2007; Paul and Hall 2013, pp. 49−53 There's a sense in which this worry is less pressing than under reductive accounts. The motivation for the deliberative approach is to make sense of why we care about causal relations. The approach is committed to cases where agents can deliberate on causes being central and paradigmatic. Our interest in causation in cases where we can't derives from our interest in cases where we can. While we can extend causal notions to situations we don't control, the less grip our notions of control have, the less grip our notions of causation will 11 The deliberative approach faces the same concerns with pre-emption as other counterfactual accounts (Hall 2004; Paul and Hall 2013, ch. 3) . My preferred response is to appeal to assumptions about normal conditionsin common with Pearl (2000, chs. 9−10), Hitchcock (2007) , and the 'de facto dependence account' discussed by Paul and Hall (2013, p. 170 But there are cases where adding an agent would disrupt the dynamics of the system. For example, say a symmetry-breaking state in the early universe caused the current universe to be mostly matter rather than antimatter. 13 Constructing a similar situation with a deliberating agent present would require making significant changes to the dynamics of the system.
12 Evidential relations to the past (or the future via the past) can be altered, for reasons given in section 4. 13 My thanks to Michael Hicks for the example.
Significant changes may also be required for agents to deliberate on volcanoes erupting or earthquakes occurring. There are also states that it is logically impossible for an agent to properly deliberate on-such as whether any agents ever exist.
14 In these cases, a hypothetical non-physical agent can be introduced to allow us to evaluate the relevant counterfactuals and work out what evidential relations would hold for a properly deliberating agent. By stipulation, the presence of a hypothetical agent has no physical effects on the system. Even though none of us are hypothetical agents, the evidential structures relevant for hypothetical agents are of the same form that actual agents make use of. They are structures where even though available evidence doesn't determine how the system goes (so an agent can properly deliberate), states that are evidentially available to decide on are evidence of further states of interest. This strategy does justice to the initial motivation for the approach-causal relations are useful because they're of an evidential form that agents can generally make use of in deliberation.
For example, say the early state of the universe doesn't determine whether a particular symmetry-breaking state (E) obtains, or whether a further state (F) obtains-say, the universe being mostly matter. Stipulate that a hypothetical agent's decision on E would evidentially settle E (and likewise for not-E). A hypothetical agent can then properly deliberate on E for the sake of F. If E is good evidence for F (something we might determine independently), then the hypothetical agent's decision on E for the sake of F (in proper deliberation) would be good evidence of F. So E counts as a cause of F. 15 We use our knowledge of the evidential relation between E and F to work out what causal relations obtain. Even though no agent can properly deliberate on E, the hypothetical agent is making use of the same general form of evidential structure that would matter to deliberating agents (were they able to deliberate).
Here's another example. Say the state of the early universe does not determine whether any physical agents ever exist (A), or whether tools exist (T). We can introduce a hypothetical agent who properly deliberates on A for the sake of T. Say A is evidence of T. Then the hypothetical agent's decision on A for the sake of T would be evidence of T, and A counts as a cause of T-even though, for logical reasons, no actual physical agent could ever properly deliberate on the existence of physical agents.
There are more difficult cases where there is no pre-existing evidential gap in the system. A gap must then be opened up by breaking evidential relations between current states and previous states of the system, while not disrupting evidential relations between present states and future states (except by way of the past). In the case of the early universe, if the state of the early universe does settle E obtaining, not-E is made evidentially available by breaking evidential relations between E and previous states, and not otherwise interfering with evidential relations between E (or not-E) and later states. Causal relations are then determined as earlier. The temporal asymmetry introduced reflects a temporal asymmetry of agency explained in section 4.2. This procedure may look somewhat artificial. But this counterfactual cases by projecting aspects of our asymmetric structure as agents onto the hypothetical deliberator. Does this appeal to projection introduce an undesirable subjectivism into the account? Not if the asymmetries of agents are explained in objective asymmetric terms (section 4.2). In simple worlds lacking these asymmetries, there may be no reason to project in one way rather than another. If we still feel that causation is temporally asymmetric at such worlds, this feeling should be explained away as a mere habit of projection.
shouldn't be surprising. As counterfactual cases become less like those that we deliberate in, the method for determining causal relations becomes less natural to apply.
Causal Asymmetry
A notable feature of causation at our world is that causes always come prior in time to their effects. While we might accept backwards causation at the microscopic level or in other metaphysically possible worlds, we don't ordinarily encounter macroscopic causes coming before their effects. Yet the laws of fundamental physics don't distinguish between the past and future (or at least not so as to readily explain causal asymmetry). Causation's temporal asymmetry needs to be explained if we're to fit causation into a scientific picture of the world. A final advantage of the deliberative approach is that it can do just that.
Correlations to the Past
Initially it might seem that the deliberative approach is ill-suited to explaining causal asymmetry. Evidence, as I've defined it, generally licenses inferences equally well towards the past and future. Rain in the afternoon is evidence of clouds in the morning as well as puddles in the evening. So it seems an evidence-based approach will imply, incorrectly, that causation is directed towards both the past and the future.
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To determine whether the evidential biconditional implies backwards causation, we need to consider what evidential relations there actually are between a properly deliberating agent's decisions and past states. Let's return to Tamsin and her umbrella. Say Tamsin usually takes her umbrella when she sees rain, so that her deciding to take her umbrella is, in ordinary 16 There is also a concern with counting spurious correlations (such as joint effects of a common cause) as causal. My response applies equally to both concerns.
cases, good evidence of rain. It may seem that the evidential biconditional will imply that Tamsin's taking her umbrella is a cause of rain. But say Tamsin hasn't yet seen the weather.
Would her decision to take her umbrella count as evidence of rain? No. The reliability of the evidential connection between her decision and the rain depends on her seeing the rain, or otherwise having evidence of it. Without her having this evidence, we have no reason to think there'll be a correlation between her decision and the rain-Tamsin would be merely lucky if she decided to take her umbrella just in cases where there was rain.
What this implies is that even if Tamsin's deciding to take her umbrella is ordinarily evidence of rain, this is not the case if she decides to take her umbrella for the sake of there being rain in proper deliberation. Why? Because proper deliberation requires Tamsin not to have evidence that settles the state she's deciding for the sake of. So she can't have evidence of rain. But without having evidence of rain, her decision is not good evidence of rain-and so her taking her umbrella doesn't count as a cause of rain. Note that it's not only from Tamsin's perspective that there is no evidential correlation between her decision and the rain. If
Tamsin's housemate Tod uses Tamsin's behaviour to decide whether he should take his umbrella, he would do well to ignore Tamsin's behaviour when she properly deliberatesher decision would not be evidence of rain, even for him.
In the case where Tamsin's decision is good evidence of rain, the evidential correlation goes For example, say Gina knows that a gene is the common cause of both smoking and cancer, (figure 2) and deliberates about whether to avoid smoking to avoid having the gene. If the correlation between having the gene and smoking is mediated by a desire to smoke, Gina's belief that she has this desire and that it is correlated with the gene gives her (subjective) evidence that she has the gene. This evidence 'screens off' the (subjective) 17 This kind of screening off is considered in Nozick (1969) , and appealed to by Eells (1982 Eells ( , 1984 , Jeffrey (1981) , Horgan (1985) , Price (1986 Price ( , 1991 Price ( , 1993 and Horwich (1987, ch. 11) . I consider concerns below. Additional concerns are raised by Sobel (1994) and Papineau (2001 Price (1986, p. 201; 1991, p. 166; 1993, p. 261 ).
G Figure 3:
The evidence Gina has while deliberating on smoking (S) for the sake of not having the gene (G), given the causal structure in figure 2 . Gina has evidence of the deliberative state (DS) that already settles whether she has the gene, and so whether she will get cancer (C), making her deliberation improper (even if it doesn't settle her smoking).
Objections and Replies
A number of objections have been raised against the screening off defence of evidential decision theory. I'll briefly consider five. My strategy will be to show that what's needed to 18 Isn't Tamsin's deciding evidence she'll take the means to her end? Her deciding to get her umbrella might be good evidence she'll walk down the hall to it. Won't the deliberative account imply her getting her umbrella is a cause of her walking? Only if Tamsin decides to take her umbrella for the sake of walking through the hall, and deciding in such a way is instrumentally irrational, a sign of motivational deficiencies (perhaps Tamsin needs an excuse to exercise). It is not how we should deliberate. For a relation between A and B to be causal under the deliberative approach, it must be the agent's deciding on A that is correlated with B, not A itself.
Objection 3: What if the deliberative state isn't present at the start of deliberation, but obtains later?
The deliberative account does not require there to be a particular point in deliberation by which screening off has occurred and a decision is recommended. What is required is that when the agent decides, the deliberation was proper and the decision has the right evidential relations.
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19 If one generalises the account to deal with probabilistic causation, a different response is needed. Say A is causally relevant to B if and only if deciding on A changes the probability of B, relative to not deciding on A. In this case, the mediating state provides as much evidence for the past as the decision does-so the evidential relevance of the decision for the past is still undermined. 20 Jeffrey (1981 Jeffrey ( , 1983 gives a 'ratificationist' defence of evidential decision theory along these lines. But this defence faces problems of its own-see Horwich (1987, pp. 188−9) . This is effectively what happens in traditional Newcomb cases, where an infallible predictor arranges the past to match whatever decision he predicts an agent will make (Nozick, 1969 (Skyrms 1980, p. 131; Lewis 1981, pp. 10−11) .
The deliberative approach appeals to objective evidential relations, and what evidence an agent has, rather than the subjective probabilities and beliefs of evidential decision theory. Gina's deliberative state may give her objective evidence of the past, even if she does not believe it does. Nor does she need to believe that she's in a deliberative state for it to provide her evidence. Provided these states are accessible to her, they plausibly count as part of her evidence. Agents may fail to live up to these objective evidential standards. But these standards are reasonable given that we do aspire to self-reflectively respond to objective reasons and evidence in deliberation. 21 More strongly, it's plausible that traditional Newcomb cases do involve backwards causation (Price 2012; Nozick 1969, p. 134) . The abnormal evidential structure implies abnormal causal structure.
There are further concerns to be faced in defending the deliberative approach. comes before decision that explains causal asymmetry. A final step in the explanation is to explain why this asymmetry holds: why deliberation comes before decision. This is a significant improvement on assuming the deliberative asymmetry as a primitive (Price 1993, p. 260) .
To explain why agents deliberate before deciding, rather than after, we should appeal to the epistemic characterisation of deliberation (section 2) and an epistemic asymmetry. Begin with the fact that we have memories of the past but nothing like memories of the future. In ordinary cases of deliberating, agents know about the immediate past in their vicinity, independently of what decisions they make now. As Tamsin deliberates on whether to take her umbrella, she is sure she was walking through the hall a minute ago. We also have knowledge of our immediate futures. Tamsin may be certain she'll leave the apartment in the next two minutes and that the hall will be there as she does. But we have knowledge of the future by way of our current decisions, intentions and habits (in the first case), or more general beliefs about the present or past and reliable behaviour (in the second). Tamsin's certainty of her own immediate past is not dependent in this way-independently of her present decisions, intentions, habits or beliefs about her present surroundings, she has memories of her past. She does not have anything like memories of her future.
According to the epistemic characterisation of deliberation, an agent can't deliberate if she is certain how she'll decide. So if Tamsin has memories of her past decisions, she can't deliberate after deciding. But because Tamsin does not have anything like memories of her future, she can deliberate before deciding. Her future remains suitably uncertain. As far as an agent's deliberative structure is generic, and tracks general epistemic features, there will be a temporal asymmetry of deliberation. 22 It is because we have memories of the past, but nothing like memories of the future, that we deliberate towards the future and not the past.
Note that this explanation is not available on competing models of deliberation (Ismael 2007; Price 2012 ) that deny ignorance conditions on deliberation.
Can we explain this epistemic asymmetry in turn? Albert (2000, ch. 6; 2015, ch. 2) gives an explanation of an equivalent asymmetry of records. Records, like memories, are local states of the present that provide reliable evidence of states of systems at other times, beyond generic regularities, and independently of knowing what happens to the system between now and then. Albert argues that the same macroscopic constraint on the early state of the universe that explains the asymmetry of entropy, the Past Hypothesis, (and the lack of such a constraint on the future) explains why there can be records of the past (and not the future).
Even though Albert uses this asymmetry of records to defend a statistical-mechanical account of causation, his explanation of it proceeds in non-causal terms, and so can be used to defend the deliberative approach. So the asymmetry of agency can be explained in objective physical terms. 23 The deliberative approaches traces causal asymmetry back to the 22 What if there are past decisions you don't remember? Can you then deliberate? Ignorance conditions won't rule out such deliberation. But if your deliberation now is to have an evidential bearing on your past decision, your past decision must settle how your deliberation will go, independently of what happens to you at times in between (when you lack evidence). Your decision will function as a record of the future. And we don't think there are such things. 23 Moreover, even if Albert's account can't be used to explain the asymmetry of agency, we can expect some other ultimately physical account to do so.
same temporal asymmetries that give rise to asymmetries of agents (figure 4). But agency still plays an essential role in explaining why correlations towards the past are undermined, and so why causes always comes before their effects.
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Figure 4: The explanation of causal asymmetry under the deliberative approach.
Conclusion
Causation might have seemed like a deep fundamental feature of the world, something whose importance we could make sense of independently of ourselves. But we should make sense of it by reference to us. According to the deliberative approach, causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we use in deliberation. Causal relations obtain just when decisions for the sake of outcomes we seek (in proper deliberation) would be good evidence of those outcomes. This correspondence explains why we pick out particular relations as causal: they are needed for good decision-making. Even though causal relations are crucially relevant for deliberation, however, they do not depend on our perspectives, beliefs, desires or practical abilities. Causal relations are as objective as the evidential relations that underlie good reasoning. This approach strikes the right balance between capturing the relevance of causation for deliberation, and its objectivity.
EXPLAINS
The deliberative approach also explains the temporal asymmetry of causation-an asymmetry not reflected in the fundamental laws. This approach demonstrates a broad strategy for doing scientifically informed philosophy:
use agential standards to pick out objective relations, explain their temporal features, and reconcile them with fundamental physics. In this particular case, the deliberative approach relates evidential and causal relations, via deliberation. The account identifies, at the most general level, how the evidential structure of the world relates to its causal structure. By doing so, it fits causation into a scientific picture of the world. 24 
